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ABSTRACT 
Previous research on reactivity – defined as changing organisational behaviour to better 
conform to the criteria of measurement in response to being measured – has found significant 
variation in company responses towards sustainability metrics. We propose that reactivity is 
driven by dialogue, motivation and capacity in a configurational way. Empirically, we use 
fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to analyse company responses to the 
sustainability index FTSE4Good. We find evidence of complimentary and substitute effects 
between motivation and capacity. Based on these effects we develop a typology of reactivity 
to sustainability metrics, which also theorises the use of metrics as tools for performance 
feedback and the building of calculative capacity. We show that when reactivity is studied 
configurationally, we can identify previously underacknowledged types of responses. We 
discuss the theoretical and practical implications for studying and using sustainability metrics 
as governance tools for responsible behaviour. 
KEYWORDS: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA); sustainability metrics; reactivity; 
motivation; capacity; dialogue 
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Soft law regulatory devices such as metrics have proliferated in the governance of corporate 
sustainability performance in recent decades (Déjean, Gond, & Leca, 2004; Mehrpouya & 
Samiolo, 2016). Such proliferation is also noticeable in financial markets, and in particular 
within responsible investment (RI) markets. Here, numerous rankings, indices and ratings 
have been developed to aid stock selection (Chatterji, Durand, Levine, & Touboul, 2016). 
These metrics1 provide information to investors, but also serve to incentivise rated companies 
to improve their sustainability performance (Rowley, Shipilov, & Greve, 2017). Such 
reactivity has been defined as changing organisational behaviour to better conform to the 
criteria of measurement (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Pollock, d’Adderio, Williams, & 
Leforestier, 2018; Rowley et al., 2017), for example by trying to increase sustainability 
transparency and/or performance. 
 Organisations react to metrics in order to obtain favourable outcomes in the process of 
being publicly measured and ranked (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2009). 
Chatterji and Toffel (2010) for example show that companies that initially receive a poor 
rating by a sustainability metric subsequently improve their environmental performance. 
Reactivity is driven by the motivation of the rated companies to reduce information 
asymmetries regarding sustainability performance (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Sharkey & 
Bromley, 2015), and seen as an opportunity to signal that the “standards of desirability” 
(Graffin & Ward, 2010; Thompson, 1967: 84) have been met. Many company managers 
believe that sustainability metrics are used by investors, consumers and other stakeholder 
groups to judge their sustainability performance (Carlos & Lewis, 2018), which increases 
                                               
1 The literature on reactivity refers mainly to metrics as “ratings”, “rankings” or “certifications” (Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2009; Carlos & Lewis, 2018). Although there are similarities in the nature of 
these categories and in outcomes with respect to reactivity, differences also exist (Graffin & Ward, 2010). We 
use the catch-all term “sustainability metrics” when reviewing the literature to indicate all public measures of 
corporate sustainability performance, including rankings, ratings and sustainability indices. We use the term 
“sustainability index” to refer to the FTSE4Good Index and other similar indices such as the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI). 
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their “allure” (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). Nonetheless, not all firms are equally capable of 
responding to metric providers. Participation in sustainability metrics is time consuming 
(Carlos & Lewis, 2018), and requires the development of specific sets of knowledge and 
expertise (Pollock et al., 2018). Most metric providers engage in dialogue with rated 
companies, for instance to request information on sustainability performance or to inform 
them about new criteria. This dialogue may further influence reactivity (Pollock et al., 2018). 
Whereas multiple studies consider either the motivation to react (Epeland & Sauder, 
2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2009) or the capacity to react (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), we don’t 
know if motivation is sufficient for reactivity to occur; whether capacity can substitute for a 
lack of motivation; nor what the role of dialogue is in reactivity. In this article, we propose 
that motivation and capacity interact to influence reactivity in a non-linear, configurational 
way (Misangyi, Greckhamer, Furnari, Fiss, Crilly, & Aguilera, 2017) against the background 
of dialogue between a metric provider and target companies. We therefore pose the following 
research question: How does dialogue with a metric provider; target company motivation; 
and target company capacity combine to produce reactivity? 
We employ a configurational method, fsQCA, to study reactivity to a sustainability 
metric, the FTSE4Good Index. Our configurational approach allows us to disentangle the 
interaction between dialogue, motivation and capacity, and shows that four different 
configurations underlie the presence or absence of reactivity. Further, we use the 
configurations obtained in our analysis to examine qualitative differences in the intra-
organisational use of metrics. We find that each configuration corresponds to differences in 
the use of the metric as a performance feedback tool, and in the way organisational capacity to 
measure and report sustainability is being developed.       
 Our research contributes to theory on the private governance of corporate 
sustainability through metrics (Mehrpouya & Samiolo, 2016). We show that reactivity to 
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sustainability metrics is configurational, that is: dependent on different combinations of 
factors leading to different types of (non)reactivity. A configurational perspective on 
reactivity allows us not only to empirically examine causal complexity, but also to theorize its 
implications for the study and practice of private governance of corporate sustainability. Our 
focus on dialogue with the metric provider offers further insights into the communicative 
action perspective (Ferraro & Beunza, 2018; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; 2011). We show how 
quantitative tools such as metrics open up a space for deliberation not only between the metric 
provider and the rated company, but also within the company. Lastly, we provide practical 
implications for “ranking entrepreneurs” (Rindova, Martins, Srinivas, & Chandler, 2018) 
seeking to create new metrics and critically discuss the role of sustainability metrics in the 
normative orientation of companies towards sustainability (Schuler, Rasche, Etzion, & 
Newton, 2017).  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Despite enduring criticisms (Esposito & Stark, 2019) the regulation of multinational 
corporations through soft law instruments such as metrics has continued unabated in recent 
decades (Mehrpouya & Samiolo, 2016). In the RI market, multiple stock market indices, such 
as  the Aspi Eurozone, Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), FTSE4Good Index, and MSCI 
ESG indices have been developed to measure the sustainability performance of listed firms 
and to aid stock selection by responsible investors (Déjean et al., 2004). The distinguishing 
features of sustainability indices are the emphasis on measurement of sustainability 
performance based on pre-set, but often competing, measurement criteria (Chatterji et al., 
2016) and their role in providing information to investors in the RI market (Hawn, Chatterji, 
& Mitchell, 2018). Another feature, which has not received much attention due to its private 
nature, is the “behind-the-scenes” dialogue between metric providers and rated companies, 
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which can range from information requests regarding company performance, to explanation 
or contestation of measurement criteria and outcomes (Pollock et al., 2018). Many, though not 
all sustainability metrics, feature such a process of engagement and dialogue, which has 
similar features to social shareholder engagement (Goodman & Arenas, 2015; Logsdon & van 
Buren, 2009), and forms the background against which reactivity towards sustainability 
metrics unfolds.           
 The regulatory role of metrics stems from their ability to produce reactivity – the 
change in behaviour in conformance with measurement criteria that occurs as a result of being 
measured and ranked (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Rowley et al., 2017: 815). Most research on 
reactivity has focused on the motivation of targeted companies to participate in the 
measurement process and to change their behaviour as a result. Participation is driven by the 
motivation to reduce information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970; King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005) 
and by beliefs about the importance of sustainability performance to investors (Flammer, 
2013). Metrics reduce uncertainty performance by providing simple information to 
stakeholders regarding aspects of performance that are difficult for them to assess (Rindova et 
al., 2018). Sustainability metrics signal that sustainability performance meets “the standard of 
desirability” (Graffin & Ward, 2010: 331). Metrics can create status orderings (Rindova et al., 
2018), which affect even non-measured companies (Sharkey & Bromley, 2015). Inclusion in 
sustainability indices is often an explicit goal, and may be signalled to investors and wider 
audiences by including the logos and names of the various sustainability indices in corporate 
reporting (Carlos & Lewis, 2018; Slager, Gond & Moon, 2012). 
 There is conflicting evidence regarding the degree to which information provided by 
sustainability indices influences investor behaviour in practice. In one of the most 
comprehensive studies to date, Hawn et al. (2018) show that inclusion or deletion from the 
DJSI has a limited effect on stock market reactions, even though benefits of inclusion have 
6 
 
increased over time for non-US companies. A recent survey shows that investors do use the 
data provided by sustainability metrics in their investment decisions, because they believe that 
this information is financially material (Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2018). The materiality of 
specific issues (e.g. carbon emissions, human rights, board diversity) varies across companies 
and industries and the financial consequences of good ratings depends on the materiality of 
the issue being rated (Khan, Serafeim, & Yoon, 2016). 
 Reactivity is particularly strong when organisations expect negative consequences 
from poor evaluations (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010) because they fear adverse impacts on 
consumer or investor behaviour (MacKenzie, Rees, & Rodionova, 2013; Sharkey & Bromley, 
2015). Especially in the case of rankings in university education settings, where a single or 
limited number of rankings exists, reactivity is strong due to anxiety about their ability to 
influence student choice (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2009). Rowley et al. 
(2017) further argue that external metrics can be used to set “aspiration levels”, where 
companies compare their performance against that of their peers. Performance feedback 
theory suggests that performance below the reference group is likely to draw attention from 
senior management (Greve, 2003), thus increasing the “anxiety” produced by metrics 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2016). 
 Furthermore, limited reactivity to external metrics occurs in situations of poor 
evaluation performance coupled with below average financial performance (Rowley et al., 
2017). In such circumstances, companies struggle to devote the time and resources to react to 
metrics, and have limited slack to do so. In light of these findings, recent studies have focused 
on the capacity of targeted companies to react to metrics. Participation in sustainability 
metrics is time consuming (Carlos & Lewis, 2018).  Companies require a certain amount of 
financial slack, human resources, administrative knowledge and organisational capabilities in 
order to respond. In a study on the DJSI, Searcy and Elkhawas (2012) note that companies 
7 
 
created specific committees, spend considerable time collecting and collating internal 
performance data, and undertook detailed reviews of performance evaluations related to the 
index. The availability of dedicated human resources—e.g. corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) managers—plays a key role in the capacity to respond (Crilly, Zollo & Hansen, 2012). 
Companies with slack resources will find it easier to develop such knowledge and expertise. 
Existing stakeholder management capacity will also help accommodate the process of 
responding to metric providers’ demands for data and information. 
 
A Configurational Approach  
Given our interest in the interplay between motivation and capacity, against the backdrop of 
dialogue, we adopt a configurational approach. Configurational perspectives highlight causal 
complexity, including the idea of conjunctural causation, where multiple causal attributes 
combine into distinct configurations to produce an outcome of interest (Misangyi et al., 2017: 
255). The configurational perspective builds on set theory and Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA). Set theory is used to conceptualise organisations as configurations of 
attributes (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2000). This means cases are conceptualised as combinations of 
theoretical attributes. The combined effect of these attributes on the outcome of interest is the 
main object of study. In our setting, companies may (not) be highly motivated to participate in 
sustainability metrics (they are (not) part of the set of highly motivated companies); they may 
(not) have developed capacity to respond to metric providers (they are (not) part of the set of 
high capacity companies). We are interested in how different configurations of these attributes 
combine to produce reactivity.       
 QCA is designed to assess such conjunctural causation empirically (Fiss, 2011; 
Misangyi et al., 2017). Using Boolean algebra, QCA can distinguish “causal recipes”: the 
different combinations of attributes that lead to the outcome of interest. In small-N 
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approaches, familiarity with the cases forms the basis for theorising about the differences 
between configurations. In particular, small-N QCA can be used to develop a richer account 
of comparative cases by using Boolean algebra to look for patterns, which can be explained 
based on in-depth case knowledge. Below we explain how we use a small N, fuzzy-set QCA 
approach to analyse how different configurations of dialogue, motivation and capacity are 
associated with reactivity. In addition, we extend the QCA analysis by undertaking a further 
qualitative analysis of the differences between cases assigned to configurations, paying 
particular attention to the intra-organisational use of metrics.  
 
METHODS, CONTEXT AND DATA 
Our focal case in this article, the FTSE4Good Index, provides investors with a list of 
companies with good sustainability performance according to a limited set of criteria, whilst 
at the same time the index team interacts with companies that do not meet the set criteria. We 
designed an in-depth case study of a limited number of companies that were, or had been, 
included in the index between 2003 and 2010, drawing on a wide range of data sources. 
 
Case Context 
The FTSE4Good Index was launched in 2001 by FTSE Group (now FTSE Russell). The 
index is used by investors to compare the performance of the selected companies against 
wider public equity markets. The index aims to identify companies with good sustainability 
practices for investors, whilst at the same time driving up its inclusion criteria in an effort to 
encourage companies to improve their sustainability performance (Slager et al., 2012). For the 
period under study (2003-2010), the performance categories cover environmental 
management, human and labour rights protection, countering bribery, climate change 
mitigation, and supply chain labour standards. All listed companies that meet a minimum 
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scoring benchmark set by FTSE on criteria related to these categories are included in the 
index. It is updated twice a year to include new companies that meet the inclusion criteria and 
exclude those that no longer comply. In the period under study, the FTSE relied on research 
by social rating agency Eiris (now Vigeo Eiris) to determine whether eligible companies met 
the inclusion criteria. 
The index criteria have been gradually updated since the inception of the index to reflect 
the changing nature of sustainability demands. This led to situations where companies 
previously included in the index failed to meet newly updated criteria. These companies were 
not automatically deleted, but instead were entered into a so-called “engagement programme”. 
They received communication from FTSE stating that if they did not work towards meeting 
the criteria, they would be deleted from the index. The metric provider thus seeks reactivity 
from target companies in an explicit way: 
Each year we write to all the companies in the index – between 850 and 900 – to all their 
Chief Executives or Chairmen and also to the practitioners that we deal with on a more 
direct basis, to say: “you are still in the index, that’s terrific.” (FTSE RI team member) 
...We send the certificate [of inclusion] to companies once a year in March. So the CEO 
will get that but he will also get a letter that says “your company needs to meet certain 
criteria to remain in the index.” (FTSE RI team director) 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The research integrates various data sources, including 43 semi-structured interviews, in situ 
observations, archival material, and collection of secondary data. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the data sources and their use in the analysis, and Table 2 provides further details 
of the 30 case companies.  
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Case companies were purposively selected to represent variance in the degree of dialogue 
they had had regarding the index criteria, ranging from no engagement to extensive 
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discussions. We initially sampled on the intensity of dialogue because we expected it to drive 
reactivity towards the index. We stopped sampling once we were satisfied that the sample 
exhibited a full range of variance in reactivity, based on interview and archival data. As a 
result of this sampling strategy, we selected “positive cases” that displayed reactivity, and 
“negative cases” that we would expect to display the outcome, but didn’t (see Greckhamer, 
Furnari, Fiss, & Aguilera, 2018). The selection of a cohort of 30 cases ensured that familiarity 
with the details of each individual case was retained, which is essential for small-N QCA 
(Crilly et al., 2012).  
Case company contact details were identified from a database maintained by the FTSE RI 
team. The case company managers contacted for interview all held responsibility for 
sustainability performance or CSR within their firm, including responsibility for interaction 
with the FTSE RI team. Archival data were collected to enable triangulation, and in order to 
counter potential retrospective bias in the interview data. We gathered extensive FTSE4Good 
archival data, had access to data provided by social rating agency EIRIS, and collected 
company public reports (see table 1). 
Our analytical strategy followed a three-stage process. In the first stage we focused on 
our qualitative interview and archival data. We tried to make sense of the dialogue between 
the metric provider and case companies (how was the dialogue structured, who was involved, 
how it evolved over time) as based on our interview and observation data we intuited that the 
dialogue served to increase reactivity. We used N-vivo software to code our data in raw first 
order codes, such as “problems with measurement”; “benefits to index inclusion”, “use of 
logo.” When we started to compare the first order codes across cases, we noticed large 
differences in the motivation for inclusion in the index; in the reported capacity to measure 
sustainability; and in reactivity. We quickly realised our data provided evidence of causal 
complexity (Misangyi et al., 2017). For example, some firms that had not experienced 
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dialogue with the FTSE RI team were still reactive, whereas others that had been in 
engagement were not. Equally, some companies were more reactive than others even when 
engaging in similar dialogue. 
In the second stage of our analysis we decided to use fsQCA as a method to explore 
causal complexity. QCA examines each case as a set of attributes, called conditions, and 
analyses the extent to which configurations of these conditions lead to the outcome under 
study using Boolean algebra.2 We relied on theoretical insights regarding reactivity, as well as 
in-depth case contextual knowledge, to derive a set of conditions reflecting interaction with 
the metric provider, motivation and capacity (see calibration of the QCA below). We use 
QCA software 2.0 to undertake the configurational analysis (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 2006). 
Company cases were assigned to the configuration to which they displayed partial or full 
membership (> 0.5 as recommended in Ragin, 2008). 
In the third stage of the analysis we returned to the qualitative case data to interpret the 
configurations from the QCA analysis. This final step is recommended as best practice in 
small-N QCA research (Greckhamer et al., 2018; see also Aversa et al., 2015). In this third 
stage, we re-examined the full qualitative evidence related to the cases assigned to each 
configuration. We use our N-vivo codes from Stage 1 in a cross-case analysis, where we 
looked at patterns in the qualitative data across the cases assigned to the four configurations of 
Stage 2 of the analysis. Specifically, we noticed that companies assigned to different 
configurations reported different intra-organisational usage of sustainability indices in 
general, and FTSE4Good in particular. The case companies assigned to the respective 
configurations differed in the way they used sustainability metrics as performance feedback 
and to build calculative capacity, which we define as the company’s capacity to measure its 
                                               
2 For a detailed description of QCA, including the use of set theory and Boolean algebra see Ragin (2008) and 
Fiss (2011). 
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own sustainability performance. In this stage we circled back and forth between theory on 
reactivity and calculability (for a review, see Mennicken & Espeland, 2019) and the data to 
theorise this concept.          
 Below, we describe the steps we took to calibrate the conditions in the QCA analysis. 
In the findings section we first present the outcome of the QCA analysis (Stage 2 in our 
analysis) followed by the cross-case analysis based on the qualitative case data (Stage 3 in our 
analysis).  
 
Calibration of the QCA 
Following QCA conventions, we treated each case as member of multiple sets (e.g., the set of 
large companies). One outcome and a limited number of explanatory conditions can be 
calibrated.3 
 
Outcome 
Our outcome of interest is reactivity to the FTSE4Good index, which can range from making 
substantive changes to sustainability practices, which are in line with the index criteria, to 
making none or only superficial changes. The outcome measure represents the idea that firms 
will react to the FTSE4Good criteria by adjusting sustainability performance in a manner 
aligned with the index criteria. These adjustments can be evidenced by improvements in the 
evaluations from the rating agency Eiris. See Table 3 for the calibration of the data into the 
reactivity outcome. Table 4 provides further qualitative evidence to substantiate the 
calibration of the outcome.4 
 
                                               
3 In small N QCA only a limited number of conditions can be included before limited diversity becomes a 
problem (a higher number of conditions means an exponentially higher number of logically possible 
configurations of conditions, which cannot all be found in the data) (Greckhamer et al., 2018; Marx 2010). 
4 It is important to note that firms could meet the benchmark threshold for inclusion in the index without 
obtaining the highest band (outstanding) of Eiris ratings. 
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------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Explanatory Conditions 
We include five conditions. The engagement condition captures the degree of dialogue 
between a case company and the metric provider. Two conditions capture motivation 
(inclusion signalling and issue salience). Two conditions capture capacity (initial 
sustainability performance and size).  
ENGAGEMENT measures the degree to which the company has been in dialogue with 
the FTSE RI team regarding the index inclusion criteria. We included this condition because 
such engagement is common in the responsible investment context (McNulty & Nordberg, 
2016). The engagement process is conducted through various means of communication, 
including emails, formal correspondence (letters), and meetings. This condition was calibrated 
by examining the archived email and letter correspondence between corporate managers and 
the FTSE RI team. We calibrated the set using thresholds based on case knowledge (see Table 
3): the index gets reviewed every 6 months; and these reviews serve as occasions to set 
deadlines for the engagement process. We also tracked the intensity of communication by 
counting the number of emails sent by the firm in response and found that longer engagement 
tended to be more intensive. 
INCLUSION SIGNALLING. Companies that are motivated to reduce information 
asymmetry about their sustainability performance want to report their inclusion in the index as 
a signal to stakeholders that their sustainability performance has met “the standards of 
desirability” (Graffin & Ward, 2010):  
The undergraduates coming through are pretty fussy about who they work for and they 
want to look for companies that do have a decent performance. This recognition by 
independent credible parties like FTSE [...] is a lot more credible than anything we can 
say on our website. (CSR Manager, C16) 
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As many companies report their inclusion in RI indices, this reinforces its influence on 
external perceptions (Espeland & Sauder, 2007). Companies are not required to report their 
inclusion and may at times choose not to because they do not perceive index inclusion as a 
viable signal to stakeholders, or because they do not want to be accused of hypocrisy (Carlos 
& Lewis, 2018). The calibration of the condition reflects whether companies report 
FTSE4Good index inclusion through their annual and CSR reports (1) or not (0).  
ISSUE MATERIALITY. Companies are also motivated to perform well in external 
metrics for instrumental reasons, such as impact on stock price movements (Flammer, 2013; 
Hawn et al., 2018).  Such impacts on financial performance depend on the materiality of the 
environmental, social or governance issues for specific industries (Khan, Serafeim & Yoon, 
2016). We use the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SABS) “materiality map” 
which indicates sustainability issues that may have material impacts on the financial condition 
or operating performance of companies in an industry (SABS, n.d.). We identify from the 
FTSE archival data the specific issue(s) the company has been engaged on and code this 
condition as 1 (in the set) if the issues are identified in the SABS map as material for the 
industry category of the company.5 If the issues are not considered material according to the 
SABS map, the firm is coded as out of the set (0). 
INITIAL SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE is the first condition that captures firm 
capacity. Firms that have already built sustainability capacity find it easier to respond to 
stakeholder demands for increased performance (Hall, Millo, & Barman, 2015; Rehbein, 
Logsdon, & van Buren, 2013). This condition also accounts for the fact that relative 
improvements in sustainability performance are more feasible when firms are initially 
performing poorly. We therefore include a measure of previous sustainability performance. 
                                               
5 If a company has not been engaged in dialogue with the FTSE RI team, the issue salience condition is also 
coded as o / out of the set 
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Our calibration thresholds are based on case knowledge: we use the EIRIS rating categories to 
determine set membership (see Table 3).       
 LARGE FIRM. This condition captures the resource element of capacity. Larger firms 
have more resources to respond to shareholder demands surrounding sustainability issues 
(Dimson, Karakaş, & Li, 2015; Rehbein et al., 2013). Larger companies are likely to have 
slack resources that can be invested in the knowledge and expertise that is required for 
reactivity. We took as our measure of size the average market capitalization of the firm during 
our observation period. Almost all of our firms are medium or large cap firms, which is a 
feature of our research context (see also Dimson et al., 2015), so we established our 
calibration thresholds on relevant external benchmarks to distinguish small, medium and large 
cap companies (see Table 3). 
We analysed the calibrated data set using the truth table algorithm (Ragin, 2008) in the 
fsQCA software program 2.0 (Ragin et al., 2006) to derive the configurations of conditions 
that are linked to the outcome. The analysis proceeds in four steps, which we describe in the 
appendix.  
FINDINGS  
We report our findings in two sections. In the first section, we detail the QCA results, and use 
one exemplary case to explain the configurations 1 and 2 for reactivity, followed by 
configuration 3 and 4 for the absence of reactivity. For each configuration, we provide 
qualitative evidence from one case company to explain the configurational effects. In the 
second section, we provide evidence of our qualitative analysis of intra-organisational use of 
metrics, describing how the case companies assigned to the four configurations differ in terms 
of use of the index for their calculative capacity and as a performance benchmark tool. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
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QCA Results 
Table 5 displays the configurations associated with reactivity (Configurations 1 & 2) and the 
absence of reactivity (Configurations 3 & 4). We also report measures of consistency and 
coverage for each individual configuration.6  
 
Configuration 1: Incremental Reactivity 
The first configuration represents cases that display reactivity: low initial sustainability 
performance, and signalling inclusion are core conditions (see Table 5). Peripherally, 
companies are large (Configuration 1a), engaged on a material issue (Configuration 1b) or 
having been in engagement with the metric provider for a considerable amount of time 
(Configuration 1c). In this configuration a high motivation is a substitute for lack of capacity: 
corresponding companies are low sustainability performers, but they use metrics as a tool to 
improve sustainability performance, in line with evidence that low performers are more 
reactive (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010).  
We label this response “incremental” because our analysis of the qualitative evidence 
of this substitute effect reveals that the companies corresponding to Configuration 1 change 
their behaviour in line with the index criteria in an incremental fashion. Such an incremental 
response is exemplified by Case Company 3 (C3), a financial services company that has 
recently been admitted to the index. It was motivated to develop sustainability policies, 
particularly with regards to environmental management, due to perceived increased 
expectations from stakeholders for addressing climate change impacts in the financial 
industry. As the company started developing its sustainability performance, it used the input 
                                               
6 It must be noted that the coverage for the solution for non-responsiveness is low, meaning that the selected 
conditions seem to be more relevant for explaining the presence of the outcome than the absence of the outcome, 
a situation that is common in QCA studies. 
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from rating agency EIRIS and the index criteria to develop its environmental management 
policies and systems:  
We’ve been working at this for a number of years and getting guidance from them 
[EIRIS] as to areas where we could improve.  And obviously where we can improve, 
we’ve taken those views on board.  Particularly in the environment side and we’ve 
made significant progress in that, which has enabled us then to become included [in 
the FTSE4Good index]. I would say that they’re very, very helpful in that..[] they’ve 
given us direction as to what we did and where we could have gone and what we 
could have done. So you know, it’s been a very useful index for us to use and to 
become more aware of where we could improve and give direction. (CSR Director, 
C3) 
Once the company was included, index inclusion was signalled by displaying the logo of the 
index in public reports and on webpages, and used as an “internationally recognised 
endorsement of behaviours” (CSR Director, C3). The company uses inclusion as a third-party 
signal to external audiences: “For us that’s very important because it’s not just self-auditing or 
self-promotion, it’s an external endorsement.” The process of developing sustainability 
performance was described by the CSR director as a “slow process” of learning how to 
improve performance; like “doing an exam – you get better over time” (CSR Director, C3):  
Anything that’s a quick fix is not going to be worthwhile because you know, otherwise 
everybody could be included. So it does take time to move that, to progress to that. 
You can’t just put something in and it automatically works overnight. So I think we’ve 
had a slow progress but it’s sustainable into the future. (CSR Director, C3) 
 
This suggests that reactivity for companies in Configuration 1 emerges in an incremental 
fashion, where high motivation to become included in the index substitutes for initial 
capacity, and leads to gradual changes in sustainability performance, in line with the index 
criteria. 
Configuration 2: Substantive Reactivity 
The second configuration also displays reactivity: high motivation (signalling index inclusion) 
and engagement are the core conditions, and peripherally, the large size of corresponding 
companies suggests a degree of capacity. This configuration captures the way dialogue with 
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the metric provider complements high motivation for index inclusion. We label such 
reactivity as “substantive” as the combination of these core conditions leads to substantive 
changes in line with the index criteria (see also Table 4). Such substantive responsiveness 
includes developing new policies or management systems, increasing the coverage of existing 
practices or adding additional activities to the responsibility of the sustainability managers. 
Case Company 30, a chemical company, exemplifies such reactivity well. It is motivated to 
react to the index because it feels it is “expected to be in it” (CSR Manager, C30). It uses 
index inclusion as an endorsement of its sustainability performance: 
A company like [ours] would consider it should be in it and people shouldn’t really 
question that we cannot stay in it.  So I think it’s a sort of recognised qualification for 
a company. (CSR Manager, C30) 
 
As a chemical company, it communicated with the index team regarding its environmental 
management practices, providing additional information to the rating agency where needed, 
but the company manager did not perceive this as arduous. As the company had operations in 
countries deemed high risk for corruption and bribery according to the index criteria, it also 
interacted with the metric provider on this topic:     
And we noticed that the criteria were strengthening and therefore, we would need to 
do something to remain in the index in that sort of area. I’ve never had a fear that we 
wouldn’t comply but whether we had the right governance in place to prove that we 
complied was what we needed to look at. So FTSE alerted us to say ‘there could be 
some areas of concern, unless you do something about providing us with some 
information on this, this and this.’ So we took that very seriously and we looked at 
what we did and we drafted something. (CSR Manager, C30) 
 
During a typical engagement process such as the one described above, companies initially get 
direct communication from the FTSE RI team, warning them that they may no longer meet 
the index inclusion criteria. A process of dialogue ensues, during which the FTSE RI team 
provides more information regarding the inclusion criteria, and what kind of evidence needs 
to be provided to meet the criteria. The engagement with the metric provider complements the 
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motivation to be in the index as an endorsement of sustainability performance, to produce 
substantive reactivity. 
    
Configuration 3: Indifferent Response 
The third configuration leads to an absence of reactivity: low motivation as evidenced by not 
displaying the logo nor being engaged on a material issue are core conditions, and 
peripherally, low capacity in terms of initial sustainability performance but large size also 
feature. Based on the lack of motivation, as well as reactivity, even in light of some capacity 
due to size, we have label this configuration “indifferent.” Only one case company could be 
assigned to this configuration based on our data, a US-based financial services company. The 
company is a low sustainability performer and perceives stakeholder pressure in the US 
financial services industry as low. A formalised environmental management policy is part of 
the index inclusion criteria, but the company sees little value in developing such policies: 
We just don’t have a formal policy to enforce that stuff [environmental management] and 
there really hasn’t been a demand to do that. […] So it’s definitely moved us down the 
road in thinking about it but it’s still not a high priority because we don’t see much 
demand on the shareholder side where people are really looking for that so much. (IR 
Manager, C15) 
We’re a small team trying to do a lot of things. So we prioritise different activities and 
that wouldn’t be the top of the list. (IR Manager, C15) 
In this exemplary case, the perceived lack of demand for sustainability performance from 
relevant stakeholders, coupled with the perception that environmental management is not a 
material issue, leads to low motivation. Capacity in the form of available resources cannot 
compensate for the absence of motivation and leads to limited reactivity. 
 
Configuration 4: Selective Response 
The fourth configuration also leads to an absence of reactivity: core conditions are an absence 
of engagement, lack of motivation due to limited materiality of the issues being measured, but 
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high capacity, both in terms of initial sustainability performance and available resources due 
to size. This configuration represents large companies generally considered to be 
sustainability leaders, which are not highly motivated and show limited reactivity.7 In this 
configuration, capacity cannot substitute a lack of motivation. We labelled this configuration 
“selective” as our evidence suggests that managers of companies that correspond to this 
configuration reflect on the differences between social rating agencies and sustainability 
indices and respond selectively only to certain metrics. They differ from the firm in 
Configuration 3 in that they do not question stakeholder demands for sustainability altogether 
but examine which metric differentiates their high performance best. We take Company 6, a 
telecommunications company, as our exemplary case. The company is a high sustainability 
performer, which had no interaction with the index team on the index criteria. According to 
the CSR manager, the company’s capacity in this area means that metrics have a limited 
influence on performance improvements:  
So it’s not crucial to us whether the FTSE4Good shows us as being excellent to very 
good, as long as we’re up there, that’s what … you know, as long as it’s a fair account of 
what we’re trying to do. So I wouldn’t say it’s a huge influence in terms of influencing 
our policy or what we do because we do it anyway. (CSR Manager, C6) 
This combination of high capacity and low motivation can be partly explained by the 
objective of the FTSE4Good index to set “challenging but achievable” index criteria (FTSE, 
2006), which are arguably easy to meet for companies who are considered sustainability 
leaders. In these cases, managers seem to put more emphasis on the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index, which is considered to be “harder to get into” (CSR Manager, C6) and therefore a more 
prestigious index to express leading sustainability performance. In sum, in this configuration a 
high level of capacity cannot substitute for a lack of motivation for reactivity. 
                                               
7 Configuration 4b covers a unique case, which we report for sake of consistency and transparency. The case 
evidence shows this concerns a former large cap firm which during the period under study had just de-merged 
(and thus become much smaller in size). Hence even though it does not share the same core conditions as 
configuration 4a, we include this case as it shares a “family resemblance” (Goertz, 2006) with cases in 
configuration 4a. 
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Qualitative Analysis of Intra-organisational Use  
In this section, we highlight differences in intra-organisational use of sustainability metrics 
across the configurations detailed in the previous section. Our insights are derived from the 
further qualitative analysis of evidence for all case companies which correspond to the 
configurations (see Table 6). Our analysis suggests that the companies use the index in two 
distinctive ways: to build up calculative capacity and as an absolute performance benchmark.  
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Using Sustainability Indices for Calculative Capacity 
The capacity to measure and account for sustainability performance using existing 
management control systems (Arjaliès & Mundy, 2013) is a precursor to effectively managing 
stakeholder demands in the environmental, social or governance domains (Freeman, Harrison, 
Wicks, Parman, & de Colle, 2010). However, making sustainability “calculable” is fraught 
with difficulties and requires significant investment of time and resources (Hall et al., 2015). 
To remain eligible for index inclusion, managers are requested annually to describe their 
sustainability policies, reporting and management systems, as well as to provide evidence 
(e.g., training modules, policy documents). Companies differ in the extent to which they have 
developed data collection and management systems to capture the sustainability data that is 
required by the sustainability indices. For example, a number of case company managers 
made the analogy with financial reporting to compare the relative underdevelopment of such 
data systems for environmental and social performance: 
If you think about the financial part, it has been developed over hundreds of years, but 
the sustainability reporting standards are recent.  And it’s developing so quickly that it is 
a huge challenge for companies. And it’s pretty difficult to measure because it involves 
everything companies do. (CSR Director, C29) 
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One of the differences between the configurations is the degree of “calculative capacity” 
in place in the target company, which we define as the company’s capacity to measure its own 
sustainability performance. In particular, we see a marked difference between the incremental 
response, where metrics are used to build up such calculative capacity, and the substantive 
response, where metrics are used to maintain the existing calculative capacity. For example, 
one of the case companies was excluded from the index for not disclosing enough information 
on its water usage. The company did not disclose this information because data on the 
relevant indicators were not gathered and monitored internally. Its managers were not able to 
answer relevant questions from EIRIS, and the company was eventually excluded from the 
index, despite efforts from the FTSE RI team to convince the company to monitor and 
disclose this information. Deletion from the FTSE4Good index however became an 
“influencing driver” (IR Manager Case 17) in setting up a more comprehensive environmental 
management system that incorporated the FTSE4Good environmental management criteria. 
Companies that show substantive reactivity have previously developed their calculative 
capacity in order to meet the metric demands for information:    
I started developing some questionnaires myself to gather the data that I was being asked 
for by FTSE. When I couldn’t find the answers, I suggested perhaps some new data we 
ought to be collecting to make sure that it would be easier for me in the future… Doing 
the FTSE thing has developed some good disciplines that we’ve built into our business 
and now it’s much easier, because it is giving you the discipline to establish procedures. 
(Communications Manager, C30) 
These companies often report “doing a bit of a stocktake” to see what information is required 
to meet index inclusion, and making a consistent effort to ensure that their calculative 
capacity continues to meet the requirements of the various metric providers (see Table 6). 
 Companies that show selective reactivity indicate that whilst they used the 
sustainability indices in the past to develop their calculative capacity, these metrics are now 
less useful for them in this sense (see also Table 6). The indifferent response to metrics also 
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shows limited use of metrics to develop calculative capacity; due to the lack of motivation 
based on perceived absence of demands for accountability. 
 
Using Sustainability Indices for Performance Feedback 
Metrics have been described as inherently relative, as they are based on a measurement 
system that compares the performance of a company against its peers (Espeland & Sauder, 
2007; Rowley et al., 2017) or against the metric of measurement (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). 
In this way, metrics can be used to set aspiration levels whereby metrics are used as 
benchmarks for company performance internally (Rowley et al, 2017); performance below the 
aspiration level is likely to spur remedial action (Greve, 2003). We find subtle differences in 
the way sustainability indices are used as performance feedback between the different 
configurations. In the incremental response, being included or remaining included in the 
metric is used as an internal benchmark, but with limited reflection on how the metric can be 
used to compare company performance to peers:  
And since it’s an important issue to be and always remain a constituent in this index, 
it’s very important for the group to show our performance as well. And the 
questionnaire does not become just a questionnaire to complete but it comes as sort of 
an evaluation and a self-assessment as well.  And the performance of the previous 
year is discussed, plus the feedback that comes from the [metric provider] as well (IR 
Director, C20) 
In the incremental configuration the metrics are used as benchmark in an absolute way: the 
goal is to become or remain included. In contrast, in the substantive configuration the metrics 
are also used to explicitly compare performance against peers, by checking who is in or out of 
the indices: 
By definition in the way that the indices are actually a benchmark, an effective way to 
see compared to others where you are [in terms of performance] (HS&E Manager, 
C23). 
24 
 
Company managers here use the feedback from multiple indices not only to signal their own 
sustainability performance, but also to signal that they are leading the pack:  
Our board takes membership of the Dow Jones [Sustainability Index] particularly, but 
also FTSE[4Good] and the other ones pretty seriously. They like to be recognised, 
they put a lot of money into being a leader in sustainable development in our industry. 
(CSR Manager, C16).     
Whilst we find little evidence of internal use of metrics for setting aspiration levels for 
the indifferent configuration, in the selective configuration metrics are used as an absolute 
minimum benchmark. The main focus for this configuration is to not to be seen falling out of 
the index, as this would signal an incongruence with high sustainability performance: “we’d 
be concerned that it wasn’t representing what we do in the best light” (CSR Manager, C6). 
This suggests that the companies in this configuration are shielded from pressure for reactivity 
by their high levels of capacity, and they use metrics as minimum benchmarks for 
performance. Deletion from the indices would be an extreme case that would breach those 
minimum benchmarks and would likely invite reflection on appropriate remedial action. 
 
DISCUSSION 
A configurational perspective on reactivity to sustainability metrics allows for the detection of 
nuance and diversity in corporate responses, which have hitherto been looked at mainly in a 
binary fashion (i.e. does the organisation react or not) (Rowley et al., 2017). Our findings 
advance prior studies of metrics through our analysis of four configurations of reactivity – 
incremental, substantial, indifferent and selective. These configurations relate to two 
underlying factors: (a) the target company’s motivation for responding, as well as (b) its 
capacity to respond. We find that motivation may substitute for capacity, but not the other 
way around. We also find complementary effects between engagement with the metric 
provider and motivation. Furthermore, we found that the four configurations of motivation 
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and capacity also display differences in their intra-organisational use of metrics in relation to 
their calculative capacity and as performance feedback. Table 7 summarises the results from 
the QCA analysis and the cross-case qualitative analysis into a typology of reactivity. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
The configurational perspective on reactivity developed in this article has important 
implications for the study and use of metrics as regulatory devices (Mehrpouya & Samiolo, 
2016; Slager et al., 2012). First, each of the four types of reactivity as summarised in Table 7 
has distinct implications for the governance of corporate sustainability. Second, the possibility 
of metrics to open up conversations on the meaning of sustainability can provide further 
insights to the communicative action perspective on shareholder engagement (Goodman & 
Arenas, 2015; Ferraro & Beunza, 2018). Lastly, debates about incommensurability (Espeland 
& Stevens, 1998) that accompany newly designed metrics, such as the Corporate Human 
Rights Benchmark, may open up space for intrinsic value motivations for sustainability issues 
such as human rights (Schuler et al., 2017). We discuss these theoretical contributions and 
practical implications of the research below. 
With regards to the regulatory effect of metrics, we find two distinct types of 
responses that entail companies improving their sustainability transparency and/or 
performance. The incremental configuration, where high motivation substitutes for low 
sustainability capacity, may be transitory (cf. Haack et al., 2012). We find that companies 
which show an incremental reactivity response typically focus in the first instance on setting 
up the internal structures for collecting the data on sustainability performance required by 
sustainability indices and social rating agencies. Using the sustainability index criteria as a 
guide they build up their calculative capacity in an incremental fashion (Raaijmakers, 
Vermeulen, Meeus & Zietsma, 2015). However, companies that showcase such as response 
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may also take inclusion in sustainability metrics as an absolute performance goal, showing 
little signs of reflexivity on the suitability of the measurement criteria (Pollock et al., 2018) 
and the fit between measurement criteria and actual sustainability goals and outcomes during 
this period. Sustainability metrics suffer from a lack of “input legitimacy” (Mena & Palazzo, 
2012); for instance, the design of the measurement criteria is rarely based on truly inclusive 
stakeholder consultation, which makes the lack of reflexivity on the metric criteria in the 
incremental configuration problematic. In addition, when metrics are used as absolute goals 
they are effectively reduced to compliance tools (Schuler et al., 2017), leaving little room for 
a “license to critique” approach, which emphasises reflection on the meaning of and 
motivations for sustainability within organisations (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2017). 
Such a “license to critique” could materialise more easily in the substantive configuration, 
which depicts companies with high levels of motivation and capacity. Substantive reactivity is 
linked to the use of sustainability indices as relative performance feedback tools. Such relative 
or social comparison is inherent to external measures (Rowley et al., 2017). Sustainability 
indices commensurate by transforming qualitative information into a quantitative rating of 
sustainability performance, along a limited set of common denominators. Such transformed 
information is easier to circulate and can be used to compare performance of large groups of 
target organisations by various audiences (Espeland & Sauder, 2007). The process of 
benchmarking against peers may engender the “inquiry and contestation” needed for a critical 
engagement with metrics (Christensen et al., 2017).      
 We also find two types of configurations where the regulatory effects of metrics are 
seemingly absent, and these two types have distinct practical implications for using metrics to 
govern corporate sustainability. The indifferent configuration characterises companies with 
low levels of motivation and capacity. Whilst recognising that sustainability metrics can be 
used as signalling devices, these companies nevertheless ignore them due to perceived lack of 
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demand from stakeholders. Such disregarding of a metric undermines its central role as a 
reference point that is made valuable through use by intended audiences (Esposito & Stark, 
2019). This suggests that intensified use of sustainability metrics by key stakeholders, such as 
investors (Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2018), may increase instrumental motivation and 
encourage companies to start making improvements in their sustainability transparency and/or 
performance.            
 In the selective configuration, a lack of motivation combines with an already high 
capacity for sustainability. Our evidence chimes with other studies that find leading 
sustainability performers may deliberately ignore certain metrics (Carlos & Lewis, 2018). The 
fact that multiple sustainability metrics exist allows target companies to pick the metric that 
portrays them in the best light. A context of multiple, competing metrics also provides target 
companies the choice whether to aspire to a given performance level on a specific metric 
(Greve, 2003; Rowley et al., 2017). When seeking regulatory effects, this configuration 
requires a different approach to the indifferent one. Metric providers should examine closely 
whether more demanding criteria akin to a “platinum standard” could incentivise these 
companies, or if convergence across metrics would provide a solution to end cherry-picking 
behaviours.           
 Whilst resistance to metrics in some fields seems futile (Espeland & Sauder, 2009; 
2016) it is clear from our findings that passive and active resistance still takes place in the 
sustainability context. Further research could explore the drivers of resistance through 
comparative research designs, exploring for example the differences in reactivity to multiple 
sustainability metrics within the same field, or across different fields. Further research could 
also examine the degree to which the more discerning approach of leading companies 
translates into increased resistance, for example by contesting the accuracy of the data sources 
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used for measurement, the measurement methodology itself, or the categories upon which it is 
based (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). 
Our article contributes further insights into communicative action perspectives used to 
study for example the role of dialogue in shareholder engagement (Goodman & Arenas, 2015; 
Ferraro & Beunza, 2019). A dimension that is less frequently studied, but which we find plays 
a core role in driving substantive reactivity to metrics, is direct engagement and dialogue with 
metric providers. Metric providers such as FTSE Russell, the provider for the FTSE4Good 
index, are ranking entrepreneurs (Rindova et al., 2018) that seek to both objectively measure 
sustainability, as well provide incentives for targeted companies to improve their 
performance. The dialogue between such ranking entrepreneurs and target companies has 
received little attention in the study of reactivity yet is a common feature of most external 
metrics. For instance, both Pollock et al. (2018) and Rowley et al. (2017) describe, for 
different contexts, how interactions between target companies and metric providers helps 
negotiate reactivity towards specific metrics, or even, aims at manipulating the outcome of 
measurement itself (Daines et al., 2010; Rowley et al., 2017). In our context, interaction with 
the metric provider complements the motivation to be included in the sustainability index for 
target companies, whilst at the same time provides an opportunity to discuss the appropriate 
changes to sustainability policies, systems and reporting that meet the index criteria. Such 
dialogue can be compared to the dialogue process in social shareholder engagement 
(Goodman & Arenas, 2015; Ferraro & Beunza, 2018), and shows the act of measurement 
opens a potential space for deliberation between the metric provider and the rated company. 
More attention should be paid to how metric engagement aims to strike a delicate balance 
between using metrics as objective signalling devices (Carlos & Lewis, 2018) and regulatory 
devices that seek to influence behaviour (Mehrpouya & Samiolo, 2016; Slager et al., 2012) 
though their deliberative capacity (Soundararajan et al., 2019).    
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 Our findings show that sustainability metrics have the potential to open a space for 
deliberation not just with the metric provider, but also within companies through the intra-
organisational use of metrics. We provide further insights into the unintended consequences 
of sustainability measurement and reporting systems for intra-organisational management 
processes (Vigneau, Humphreys & Moon, 2015). Future studies could elaborate on these 
insights by focusing on sustainability-related “tools-in-use” (Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015: 
538-541) within organisations as well as the presence of management control systems 
oriented towards sustainability (Gond, Grubnic, Herzig, & Moon, 2012), and evaluate the fit 
between such tools and the characteristics of metrics to explain reactivity. The communicative 
action perspective can also be used to pay more attention to the ways in which a “license to 
critique” (Cristensen et al., 2017) can be promoted through the intra-organisational use of 
metrics, and the implications for metric design so that they can promote the normative ideals 
of sustainability rather than “box-ticking” forms of compliance.     
 Like other private governance tools, metrics might encourage an instrumental 
normative orientation to sustainability (de Bakker, Rasche, & Ponte, 2019), where reactivity 
towards sustainability metrics is motivated by market motivations such as increased access to 
responsible investors (Hawn et al, 2018). This instrumental orientation, which is dominant in 
the study of private governance tools such as standards and metrics, risks the neglect of other 
types of motivations such as deontological reasoning (De Bakker et al., 2019:345). At the 
same time, attempts at benchmarking sustainability issues such as corporate human rights 
performance may also engender questions of incommensurability (Espeland & Stevens, 
1998). To claim that something is incommensurable means to argue that “things that are 
defined as socially unique in a specific way: They are not to be expressed in terms of some 
other category of value” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 326). The design of metrics for 
corporate human rights performance, for instance by the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark 
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(CHRB) has been criticized on the basis of incommensurability: “From a human rights 
perspective, every adverse human rights impact is one too many; there is no need to count and 
measure” (DeFelice, 2015: 537). Such debates on the incommensurability of sustainability 
issues may therefore engender an intrinsic value orientation, where sustainability is valued 
intrinsically and “for its own sake” (Schuler et al., 2017: 223) and where inclusion of all 
relevant stakeholder groups, including victims of corporate human rights abuse, are heard 
(Dhir, 2012; Goodman & Arenas, 2015). 
Our results have important managerial implications for metric providers in the 
sustainability domain, especially at a time when we witness increased coordination of efforts 
through initiatives such as the World Benchmarking Alliance,8 which brings together multiple 
metric providers in domains related to reporting, engagement, certification, audit and 
sustainability metrics. Increasingly, ranking entrepreneurs are developing metrics with the 
specific purpose of governing the sustainable behaviour of companies, for instance the 
aforementioned Corporate Human Rights Benchmark. The implication of the diversity in 
reactivity that is uncovered through the configurational approach, is that ranking 
entrepreneurs may need to deploy context specific “recipes” in their work. In other words, 
careful attention needs paid to the type of reactivity and the different underlying reasons and 
motivation for these responses and to normative questions regarding the input legitimacy and 
incommensurability aspects of sustainability metrics.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We examine reactivity to a sustainability index using a configurational approach, by asking 
how the attributes of dialogue, motivation, and capacity combine to produce reactivity. We find 
                                               
8 https://www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org/  
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that motivation may substitute for capacity, but not the other way around. We also find 
complementary effects between engagement with the metric provider and motivation. We find 
four types of reactivity responses that correspond to different intra-organisational uses of the 
metric. We show how sustainability indices can be used to build or maintain calculative 
capacity; and serve as relative or absolute performance feedback tools. We develop a more 
nuanced theorisation of reactivity and its underlying dimensions, which shows that metrics 
cannot be used straightforwardly as regulatory devices, but that attention needs to be paid – 
both in research and practice – to the interaction effects between different conditions for 
reactivity. Future research and practice can build on the configurational perspective advanced 
here to develop deeper insights into the effectiveness of sustainability metrics for directing 
organisational change. 
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Table 1: Data sources and use in data analysis 
Data source Use in the analysis 
Interviews  
 Interviews with CSR executives (N=30; see 
table 2 for details of case companies) 
 Case companies were purposively selected 
on:  
 variance in the degree of dialogue with the 
FTSE RI team, based on a first analysis of 
the archival material (see below) 
 variance in terms of industry sectors and 
geographical regions 
 
 The majority of interviews (28) were 
conducted by telephone, the rest was 
conducted face-to-face. The interviews lasted 
between 45 minutes to 1 hour 30 mins, and all 
but one of the interviews were recorded and 
transcribed for analysis 
 
 Interview topics included their beliefs about 
the value of inclusion in the Index, their 
degree of dialogue with the FTSE RI team 
and the consequences of index inclusion for 
the company’s sustainability performance. 
 
To establish the typical company process of 
responding to the FTSE4Good index; the 
reasons for inclusion, and to obtain qualitative, 
in-depth descriptions of reactivity (or lack 
thereof) 
 
Validate and triangulate evidence, emerged 
from archival data, on the process of 
engagement with the metric provider 
 
Validate and triangulate evidence, emerged 
from the QCA analysis, on the motivation and 
capacity to respond to the metric provider 
 
 
 Interviews with metric provider (N=13): 
 All FTSE RI team members (6) 
 Policy Committee members (5) 
 EIRIS researchers (2) 
 
 The interviews were conducted face-to-face 
(except those with EIRIS researchers), lasted 
between 30 mins and 1hour 30 mins, and all 
interviews were recorded and transcribed 
 
To establish the motives of the metric provider 
regarding explicitly promoting reactivity; to 
validate a finegrained timeline of the 
development of the index during 2001-2010; 
to gather insights into company reactivity 
from the perspective of the metric provider 
 
 8 Policy Committee meetings (lasting approx.5 
hours each); 1 Criteria Development committee; 
2 meetings with companies were observed.  
 The archival data was mostly gathered at a 
computer situated within the group of desks of 
the FTSE RI team, allowing for numerous 
informal conversations over a period of about 12 
weeks in total 
 Informal follow-up interviews were conducted 
with FTSE RI team members between ‘08-‘11  
To contextualize the engagement dialogue as 
reported in index review meetings; to observe 
to what degree reactivity formed an explicit 
goal for the metric provider 
 
Validate and triangulate evidence, emerged 
from archival data and interview data, on the 
process of engagement with the metric 
provider 
 
To validate the timeline of the development of 
the index; to discuss emerging insights 
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Table 1: Data sources and use in data analysis (continued) 
Data source Use in the analysis 
Archival material 
 Correspondence with FTSE4Good included  
companies dated between 2001-2010 were 
collected (in total 500+ emails; 239 
“commitment letters”)* 
 
 Minutes of Index review meetings and 
discussion documents (in total approx.. 700 
pages)* 
 
 Publicly available FTSE reports: 
 6 reports detailing index criteria 
 2 review reports 
 
 
To establish a fine-grained timeline of events; 
to identify the topic of engagement and 
motivations for reactivity as identified in the 
dialogue before the interviews  
 
To refresh CSR executive memories about 
engagement and reconstruct the dialogue from 
their point of view during the interviews 
 
To validate and triangulate emerging insights 
from the interview data after the interviews 
 
Secondary data Use in the analysis 
 Database on sustainability performance 
provided by EIRIS, the social rating agency 
providing data to the metric provider in the 
period of observation 
 
The data related to the years 2003-2010 for the 
30 case corporations against the FTSE4Good 
Index criteria was examined to calibrate the 
outcome measure of reactivity (see table 4) 
 
To validate and triangulate emerging findings 
from the interview data 
 
 
 Corporate communication on CSR in reports 
and web pages, for the period covering 2001-
2010, where available for the 30 case 
companies 
To established if and how case companies 
communicate about their inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good index and other sustainability 
metrics 
 
To validate and triangulate emerging findings 
from the interview data 
 
Note:* the correspondence and meeting notes related to the 30 case companies were analysed in-
depth 
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Table 2: Case company details 
Case  Job title  Country Sector 
1 CSR Director Switzerland Industrial Machinery 
2 CSR Manager Australia Gas distribution 
3 CSR Director Ireland Financial Services 
4 Communications Director UK Passenger transport 
5 VP CSR Australia Mining 
6 CSR Manager UK Telecommunications 
7 CSR Manager UK Telecommunications 
8 Company Secretary UK Travel & Leisure 
9 Communications Director USA Commercial Vehicles  
10 CSR Manager Denmark Financial Services 
11 IR Director Germany Courier Service Industry 
12 IR Manager Italy Oil & Gas 
13 HS&E Manager USA Personal Products 
14 HS&E Manager UK Industrial Suppliers 
15 IR Manager USA Financial Services 
16 CSR Manager Switzerland Cement 
17 IR Manager USA Pharmaceutical 
18 CSR Manager France Electrical Equipment 
19 IR Director France Luxury Goods 
20 IR Director Greece Financial services 
21 CSR Manager Australia Mining 
22 IR Manager Switzerland Pharmaceutical 
23 HS&E Manager Switzerland Chemical 
24 CSR Director USA Financial services 
25 CSR Director Sweden Telecommunications 
26 CSR Director Germany Travel & Leisure 
27 CSR Manager Austria Utilities - Electric 
28 Director CSR Finland Industrial Machinery  
29 CSR Manager New Zealand Retail 
30 CSR Manager Norway Chemical 
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Table 3: Calibration table 
 Name Description Data source Calibration benchmarks 
Outcome: Reactivity Measures changes in 
sustainability 
performance that align 
with the index criteria 
Eiris 
database of 
sustainability 
performance 
We convert the text grading of EIRIS’ evaluations into scores from 0 (no evidence) to 4 
(advanced), and sum the total improvement in scores over the period 2003 - 2010. We calibrate 
set membership based on quartiles, consistent with EIRIS’ banding. The top quartile represents 
full membership (1) in the set of firms that are reactive and the bottom quartile represents full 
non-membership (0) in the set of firms that are reactive. The second and third quartiles represent 
partial membership (0.33, 0.66). 
Conditions: Engagement The index team is in 
dialogue with the focal 
firm 
FTSE 
archival data 
 Out of the set (0): Firms that have not received engagement emails or letters 
 More out than in (0.33): Firms where email and/or letter correspondence took place over a 
period less than 6 months  
 More in than out (0.67): Firms where email and/or letter correspondence took place between 
7-18 months  
 Fully in the set (1): Firms were email and/or letter correspondence took place over a period of 
more than 18 months  
Motivation Inclusion 
signalling 
The focal firm displays 
the FTSE4Good logo 
Corporate 
data 
 Out of the set (0): firm does not display the logo 
 Fully in the set (1): firms displays the logo 
Issue 
materiality 
The company is 
engaged on a material 
issue 
SABS data, 
archival data 
 Out of the set (0): the issue on which the firm is engaged is not material 
 Fully in the set(1): the issue on which the firm is engaged is material 
Capacity Initial 
sustainability 
performance 
 
Average firm 
sustainability 
performance rating at 
the beginning of the 
observation period 
 
Eiris data  Out of the set (0): Firms that in the first year have an average performance score across all 
dimensions of 1 or below, i.e. in the EIRIS category of “no evidence” 
 More out than in (0.33): Firms with average scores between 1 and 2, i.e. consistent with the 
EIRIS category “limited” 
 More in than out (0.67): Firms with average scores between 2 and 3, i.e. consistent with the 
EIRIS category “good”. 
 Fully in the set (1): Firms with an average score above 3, i.e. in the EIRIS category of 
“advanced” 
Large firm Market capitalisation Datastream  Out of the set (0): Firm with a market cap of less than $1.3 billion; the average market cap for 
firms in the FTSE Small Cap Global index 
 More out than in (0.33): Firms with a market cap between $1.3 billion and $4.5 billion; the 
median market cap of the FTSE All World index, which includes mid and large cap 
companies. 
 More in than out (0.67): Firms with a market cap between $4.5 billion and $14.4 billion  
 Fully in the set (1): Firms with a market cap of more than $14.4 billion; the average market 
cap of firms in the FTSE All World index  
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Table 4: Qualitative Evidence of the Calibration of the QCA Outcome Measure Reactivity 
Set 
membership 
score  
Corresponding 
outcome  
Change in EIRIS 
scores after 
engagement  
Examples of corresponding changes in CSR practices (from interview and archival data) 
0  Absence of 
reactivity  
0 ≤ 2  Limited evidence of change:  
 The CSR practices of case corporations 5 and 6 were consistently evaluated as “good” or “advanced” 
across the range of FTSE4Good criteria  
 To meet the FTSE4Good criteria for environmental management case corporation 15 was required to 
publish an environmental management policy. The company drew up a 1 page policy document and 
published it on its website, which led to its evaluation being upgraded from “no evidence” to “limited”, 
whilst evaluation of CSR policies on other issues remained the same.  
 
0.33  Absence of 
reactivity 
3 ≤ 4  Some evidence of change:  
 To meet the FTSE4Good criteria for climate change mitigation case corporation 2 was required to provide 
more information on climate change policy and its emissions, including showing at least a 5% reduction in 
carbon intensity over two years, or having undertaken a “transformational initiative” to reduce GHG 
emissions. Having provided sufficient data according to metrics requested by the researchers, the 
company was deemed to have improved from “intermediate” to “good” on both accounts.  
 
0.67  Reactivity 5 ≤ 6  Moderate evidence of change:  
 The internal management systems of case corporation 25 related to its Code of Conduct were not 
sufficient to meet the FTSE4Good criteria for countering bribery. The corporation needed to implement 
more substantive management systems, including training relevant employees, and outlining procedures to 
remedy non-compliance. It also was required to report on its ethics policy and monitor compliance. The 
corporation was deleted from the Index, but a new head of CSR contacted the FTSE RI team six months 
later to outline the changes the corporation had been making to its management systems. EIRIS then 
upgraded its evaluation from “limited” to “intermediate” for both ethics and human rights management 
systems, and the corporation was re-admitted to the Index.  
 
1  Reactivity ≥ 7  Considerable evidence of change:  
 Whilst case corporation 18 had a policy related to human rights, it did not provide evidence it trained 
relevant employees, monitored implementation of the policy, consulted with local stakeholders or 
undertook risks assessments. Having identified these shortcomings the corporation developed a consistent 
policy and management system to be applicable across all subsidiaries over a period of several years, 
improving its EIRIS rating for its policy from “limited” to “good” and its rating of management systems 
to “intermediate” as it did so.  
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Table 5: Outcome of the QCA Analysis 
Conditions 
Reactivity 
(outcome = present) 
Non-reactivity 
(outcome = absent) 
Incremental Substantive Indifferent Selective 
1a 1b 1c 2 3 4a 4b 
 Engagement    
● ● 
 
ø  
M
o
ti
v
at
io
n
 
Inclusion 
signalling ● ● ● ● ø 
  
ø 
Issue  
Materiality 
  
● 
  
ø ø ø 
C
ap
ac
it
y
 
Initial 
sustainability 
performance  
Ø ø ø 
  
ø ● ● 
Large firm  
● 
   
● 
 
● ● 
 
ø 
Consistency 0.97 0.85 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.81 1.00 
Raw Coverage 0.54 0.21 0.48 0.46 0.11 0.34 0.05 
Unique Coverage 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.32 0.03 
Number of cases 7 3 8 10 1 4 1 
Overall solution 
consistency 
0.88 0.85 
Overall solution 
coverage 
0.73 0.45 
 
Note: Large circles  represent core conditions, small circles represent peripheral conditions. A  filled-in  circle 
means the condition is present; a  circle with a line through it means the condition is absent.
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Table 6: Differences in intra-organisational metric use between configurations 
Reactivity 
response 
type 
Use of 
metrics for 
calculative 
capacity 
Qualitative evidence for calculative capacity Use of metrics as 
performance 
feedback 
Qualitative evidence for use in performance feedback 
Incremental Building 
calculative 
capacity 
 I do my very best but still if there are some topics we 
are not yet able to respond to adequately, I have to pull 
together a lot of people to be answering these new 
issues and then there might be a case that I can’t really 
do it. (C26)  
 So it was the first time for us [answering the question 
for FTSE4Good inclusion] and then we actually worked 
on making the internal reporting stronger, to reinforce 
our  internal reporting, just be able to have most of the 
information available at the group level immediately.  
So that when we receive the questionnaire we are able 
in the best cases to answer them. (C18)  
Absolute – how 
to get in 
 The exercise, you go through it and collect the 
information, it kind of motivates us every year to want 
to continue to do better. And they [the metric provider] 
do publish a benchmarking spreadsheet and we do 
circulate that.  It doesn’t tell you what exactly you can 
improve upon but when you look at your score and 
you look at the questions, you can kind of tell. (C9) 
 We were criticised probably two years ago for not 
having any environmental target. We didn’t lose any of 
our listings but there was criticism and we did explain 
to the researchers that we were working on targets. 
And as you’ve seen, we’ve set those targets and we’ll 
be reporting on them later in the year. So I don’t think 
we’ve ever come close to losing accreditation but it 
would certainly be an area where you know, we would 
have to explain to the Board the reason. (C8) 
 
Substantive Sustaining 
calculative 
capacity 
 So we have an online tool where we send out 
information request …Also when the DJSI comes with 
their unique set of questions, this online tool actually 
helps us to take the original answers and format them 
into the DJSI questionnaire..That’s the way we do it, it 
has actually become a lot more systematic than it was 
when we first kind of just did it sending emails out to 
people. Having that internal structure in place to gather 
the data is important. (C24)  
 I mean the [internal] CSR questionnaire is largely 
driven by the questions I have to answer, some of the 
information requirements I know I’m going to be asked 
for FTSE and for Dow Jones. So it definitely influences 
the information-gathering techniques internally. (C16) 
Absolute and 
relative – 
compared to 
peers 
 By definition in the ways that the indices like those, 
there are actually a benchmark, an effective way to see 
whether compared to others where you are. You also 
have to be careful about that because we are 
sometimes surprised, because in the technical sectors, 
we know each other quite well. I was sometimes 
surprised at the very good ranking of some companies 
.. we don’t see quite so many differences between 
them and us. (C23) 
 We do scrutinise the results of the ratings, particularly 
CDP and DJSI. We look where we can improve and 
also what our peers and competitors are doing. This 
actually happens particularly with very good or very 
bad results. (C10) 
43 
 
Table 6: Differences in intra-organizational metric use between configurations (continued) 
Reactivity 
response type 
Use of 
metrics for 
calculative 
capacity 
Qualitative evidence for calculative capacity Use of metrics as 
performance 
feedback 
Qualitative evidence for use in performance 
feedback 
Indifferent limited  So it’s very difficult to respond to enquiries, there’s 
too many companies that send the work to you and 
tell you “Here, we want to score you; you do the 
work for us and send it back and then we’re going to 
sell it.”  And there’s no value there to us.  And some 
of them will even tell you that if we want a copy of 
our report, we can pay for it; they don’t even offer us 
and say “Hey, if you respond, we’ll give you copies 
of stuff.” So there’s really no interest for a company 
to respond to these. (C15) 
 
Limited  No, I don’t think [we use it as a benchmark]. Not to 
sound too arrogant but I think part of it stems from the 
fact that we are in the S&P500 [note: not a 
sustainability index], so I mean that is our primary 
investor audience, so once you’re in that, I think that’s 
one of the barometers. (C15) 
Selective limited  I think we’ve had to sort of evolve our approach over 
time.  [In the past], we would look at FTSE and Dow 
Jones and other things to get a sense of what’s 
important or deemed to be important by our key 
stakeholders.  And then we would develop our 
systems to address those issues and enable us to 
respond to them as well. Now we use other 
indicators, like the GRI. (C5) 
 We were informed that we would need to satisfy the 
climate change criteria and perceived that that would 
take us a very long time for us to consider what those 
criteria involved, to put in management systems in 
place, to report on performance. I satisfied those 
criteria in an afternoon. Because we already had 
those systems in place and they have been embedded 
for many years. That is not to say that is the 
experience of all organisations, I would be surprised 
if it was. It is an area that we have been focussing on 
for a very long time. (C21) 
Absolute – don’t 
want to fall out 
 If we were delisted, we would certainly make sure that 
certain people in the company knew why, so that we 
could make a decision if we wanted to get relisted 
what we would have to do (C5) 
 The converse of this is if we had a bad rating in the 
FTSE4Good, then that would draw attention to us and 
we’d be concerned that it wasn’t representing what we 
do in the best light.  So I think we’d have to investigate 
and try and understand why we got a bad rating and 
see what was going on there. (C6) 
  
 
Note: case company numbers in parentheses
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Table 7: A typology of reactivity to sustainability metrics 
Type of 
reactivity 
response 
Motivation Capacity Role in 
calculative 
capacity 
Role in 
performance 
feedback 
Incremental High Low Building Absolute goal 
 
Substantive High High Maintaining Relative 
comparison  
Selective Low High Limited Absolute minimum 
 
Indifferent Low Low Limited Limited 
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APPENDIX 
The QCA analysis proceeds in four steps. The first step involves analysing whether necessary 
conditions are present (in general, necessary conditions are those conditions that, whenever 
the outcome is present, are also present). We found no necessary conditions (results are 
available in the supplementary materials). The next step involved the construction of a truth 
table with includes each possible combination of conditions. We use the fsQCA algorithm to 
construct the truth table. 
Next, the number of these combinations in the truthtable is reduced using consistency 
and coverage thresholds. Consistency, which can range from 0 to 1, measures “the degree to 
which instances of an outcome agree in displaying the causal condition” (Ragin, 2008: 44). 
Coverage, also varying between 0 and 1, measures the extent to which the solutions explain 
all cases of the outcome. We set one as the frequency threshold, which is a suitable level for 
small-N studies, and use 0.8 as the consistency threshold, in line with recommended levels 
(Ragin, 2008).           
 The fourth step is to further reduce the truth table into simplified combinations (Fiss, 
2011). The QCA algorithm derives solutions that differ in complexity. The parsimonious 
solution derives configurations which are strongly simplified using Boolean algebra, whilst 
the intermediate solution takes into account only the most plausible simplifying assumptions 
(Ragin, 2008). Based on the literature, we assume the presence of engagement, issue salience 
and inclusion signalling to contribute to reactivity. We make no assumptions about the 
capacity conditions due to limited theoretical guidance. In line with QCA conventions, we 
use the parsimonious and intermediate solution to present core conditions—those only 
present in the parsimonious solution—and peripheral conditions—those also present in the 
intermediate solution. 
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